

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OSLO 01016 01 OF 02 280748Z

11
ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAM-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 EB-07 COME-00

ACDA-05 OES-03 SAJ-01 /093 W
----- 055547

R 271600Z FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1217
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 1016

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PROG, NO
SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: NORWAY

REF: STATE 37591

1. FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS PARA SEVEN
REFTEL:
A. NORWEGIAN MULTILATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
FOR 1976 ARE, AS IN PAST SEVERAL YEARS, CENTERED
AROUND NORWAY PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE UN, ITS
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, EFTA, NATO, THE NORDIC COUNCIL,
UNCTAD AND ECOSOC. A LARGE MERCHANT FLEET, SUB-
STANTIAL OIL/GAS RESERVES, AND NON-MEMBERSHIP IN
THE EEC DICTATE NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN LOS
DELIBERATIONS, THE OECD, THE IEA, THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, THE IMF, AND THE IBRD.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OSLO 01016 01 OF 02 280748Z

A FUNDAMENTAL NORWEGIAN OBJECTIVE IN MULTILATERAL

DIPLOMACY IS TO MAINTAIN FULL FREEDOM OF ACTION AS A STRATEGICALLY LOCATED WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY. THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROVIDED BY NATO ALLIANCE GUARANTEES THIS FREEDOM OF ACTION, A FACT FULLY APPRECIATED BY NORWAY AND WELL REFLECTED IN NORWEGIAN POLICY IN NATO. NORWAY SIMULTANEOUSLY PURSUES HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES, A WORLDWIDE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND COOPERATION THROUGH THE UN. NORWAY CONTINUES TO EXERCISE A ROLE IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS OF THE NORDIC COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY IN TECHNICAL LEVEL COOPERATION; RECENTLY NORWAY'S OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESERVES HAVE INTENSIFIED COUNCIL INTEREST IN NORWAY' POLICIES IN THIS FIELD.

NORWAY WILL REMAIN STEADFAST SUPPORTER OF (A) DISARMAMENT WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON REDUCING SOVIET NORTHERN FLANK CONCENTRATIONS WITHIN CONTEXT OF US/NATO OBJECTIVES, (B) MAXIMUM DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE LDC'S, AND (C) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SPECIFICALLY THE AIR POLLUTION AND ACID RAIN PROBLEMS PLAGUING SOUTHERN NORWAY.

B. NORWAY IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER COUNTRIES OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. THE EFFECT THAT THIS HAS ON NORWEGIAN POLICY DEPENDS, OF COURSE, UPON THE ISSUE BUT GENERALLY SPEAKING NORWAY IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE IN INSTANCES WHERE A POLICY HAS ALREADY BEEN FORMULATED AND ANNOUNCED. SIMILARLY, THE NORWEGIANS ARE RELUCTANT TO BRING PRESSURE ON OTHER COUNTRIES ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT HESITATED TO DO SO WHEN THE ISSUE WAS JUDGED DIRECTLY IN NORWEGIAN NATIONAL INTEREST. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS, NORWAY FAVORED SPECIFIC POSITIONS ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBM'S) AND ACTIVELY SOUGHT SUPPORT ON THESE ISSUES. MORE RECENTLY THE UK/ICEDLANDIC DISPUTE CAUSED SERIOUS CONCERN IN OSLO FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY STANDPOINT AND THE RESULT WAS A POSITIVE NORWEGIAN INITIATIVE IN NATO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OSLO 01016 01 OF 02 280748Z

IN OTHER AREAS, NORWAY PAYS PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE EEC AND AS A NON-MEMBER TENDS TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF EEC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE QUESTIONS, ALL OF WHICH HAS GROWN OUT OF THE REJECTION OF EEC MEMBERSHIP IN 1972 NATIONAL REFERENDUM. NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS ALWAYS CONSULT AND "COORDINATE" POLICIES BEFORE UNGA SESSIONS.

NORWEGIAN INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, DOES NOT INCLUDE A WILLINGENESS
TO COORDINATE UN POLITICES OR VOTING PATTERNS IN NATO.
NORWAY, CITING A LONG STANDING POLICY OF NOT INTER-
MINGLING UN AND NATO POLICIES, OPPOSED THE ORIGINAL
US PROPOSAL BUT ASSENTED TO A BELGIAN COMPROMISE
(SEE OSLO 212).

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OSLO 01016 02 OF 02 290800Z

12

ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAM-01 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 AID-05 EB-07

COME-00 ACDA-05 OES-03 /093 W

----- 063353

R 271600Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1218

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY REYKAJVIK

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 OSLO 1016

C. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT FULLY INSTRUCTS ITS
DELEGATIONS TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS AND RE-
TAINS EFFECTIVE CONTROL. ON OCCASION NORWEGIAN
DELEGATIONS ARE GIVEN A DEGREE OF LATITUDE TO MAKE
DECISIONS ON THE SPOT PROVIDED THAT THE ISSUE IS
NOT POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE DOMESTICALLY. THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY HAS PERIODICALLY AUTHORIZED ITS DELEGATIONS
TO CONSIDER "GROUNDSWELLS OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION"
IN MAKING FINAL DETERMINATIONS ON WHICH WAY TO VOTE.
REPORTING BY NORWEGIAN DELEGATIONS IS NORMALLY EXCELLENT
AND MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE THE MINISTRY

TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS IN TIMELY AND REALISTIC FASHION. AS A RESULT OF THE IMPORTANCE NORWAY ATTACHES TO ITS PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE CALIBER OF OFFICERS STAFFING THESE MISSIONS IS UNUSUALLY HIGH. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF NORWAY'S HIGH-POWERED, INFLUENTIAL MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS (SEE 75 OSLO 2924).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OSLO 01016 02 OF 02 290800Z

THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT TAKES A KEEN INTEREST IN THE MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF NORWEGIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INSISTS ON BEING CONSULTED BEFORE MAJOR DECISIONS ARE TAKEN. PARLIAMENT ALSO REVIEWS FINAL ACTIONS AT UNGA SESSIONS. DURING THE COURSE OF 1974 AND 1975, PARLIAMENTARIANS BECAME INCREASINGLY DISTURBED WITH THE NUMBER OF NORWEGIAN ABSTENTIONS AT THE UN. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED THAT NORWAY ABSTAIN LESS AND SEEK WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF UN RESOLUTIONS IF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SUPPORTED THE GENERAL THRUST OF SUCH RESOLUTIONS. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, PREVENT RESERVATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS FROM BEING STATED IN DETAIL. THE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN USED WITH THE EMBASSY WHEN WE HAVE SOUGHT NORWEGIAN ABSTENTION ON CERTAIN ISSUES (SEE REPORT ON GUAM/DECOLONIZATION RESOLUTION 75 OSLO 5395).

D. HEADS OF NORWEGIAN DELEGATIONS HAVE NO ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL POLITICAL POWER WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL OR INSTRUCT THEM.

E. NORWEGIAN RECEPTIVITY TO US REPRESENTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES AGAIN DEPENDS UPON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION AS WELL AS CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS PAST NORWEGIAN POSITIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICAL SENSITIVITY, ETC. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS TEND TO JUDGE ISSUES ON THEIR MERIT. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY PREPARES CAREFULLY IN ADVANCE, EARLY INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON WILL ENHANCE OUR IMPACT DURING NORWEGIAN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. THE DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE WHICH THE EMBASSY INFORMS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WE ATTACH TO THE ISSUE IS ALSO A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING OUR INFLUENCE ON THE NORWEGIAN DECISION. ONCE THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE ITS MIND UP, HOWEVER, IT CANNOT BE STAMPEDED; REPEATED DEMARCHES CAN PROVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

THE NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (AND THE EMBASSY) ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BILATERAL CON-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OSLO 01016 02 OF 02 290800Z

SULTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY PRE-UNGA.
THE NORWEGIANS ARE ALWAYS FRANK, OPEN-MINDED IN THEIR
APPROACH, EXTREMELY WELL INFORMED AND FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE FACT
THAT US/NORWEGIAN INTERACTION IS PART OF BILATERAL RELATIONS.

THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT INFREQUENTLY SEEKS US
SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH WE ARE OCCASIONALLY ASKED TO BACK
A NORWEGIAN CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE. HERE AGAIN, WHEN THE
NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS A MATTER TO BE OF DIRECT
CONCERN TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST OR OF HIGH DOMESTIC
POLITICAL INTEREST, OUR SUPPORT IS SOLICITED PROMPTLY.
SUCH WAS THE CASE WITH THE SINCERE BUT POLITICALLY
NAIVE NORWEGIAN DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCES (UNEF) IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
APART FROM MULTILATERAL MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE, THE
NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ROUTINELY CONSULT THE
EMBASSY ON THE GENERAL APPROACH OR PRIORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE
NOTED THAT THE POLICIES OF THE TWO NATIONS IN THIS
REGARD ARE OFTEN EXTREMELY CLOSE.
BYRNE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, CASP
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976OSLO01016
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760076-0752
From: OSLO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t1976025/aaaaadqc.tel
Line Count: 250
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 STATE 37591
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 APR 2004 by greeneet>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: NORWAY
TAGS: PFOR, PORG, NO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006